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Hinde: The International Environmental Court: Its Broad Jurisdiction as

NOTE
THE DISCREPANCY IN BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 330:
CAN A CHAPTER 7 DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY COLLECT FEES
FROM THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal bankruptcy has experienced many changes in its laws
throughout its history. Some of these changes have been drastic changes
while others were minor adjustments to the existing laws. The first
federal bankruptcy law was passed in 1800.1 At that time bankruptcy
relied mainly on state laws. 2 The Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1800
allowed only creditors to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding "upon proof of
[a] debtor's commission of an act of bankruptcy., 3 Major bankruptcy
action by the federal government occurred again in 1841 and 1867. 4
However, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 became the major starting point of
permanent federal bankruptcy, staying in effect until it was replaced in
1978. 5 "Much of the 1898 Act was directed not at debtor relief, but
rather at facilitating the equitable and efficient administration and
distribution of the debtor's property to creditors." 6 There were many
amendments made to the 1898 Act, particularly the Chandler Act, which
in a large part was brought on by the Great Depression. The Chandler
Act revised almost all provisions of the 1898 Act focusing on improving
bankruptcy administration and a reworking of the organization
8
provisions, such as having Chapter X govern corporate reorganizations.
The next major change in bankruptcy law came with the passing of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 9 The 1978 Act was a
1. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 14 (1995).
2. See id. at 13.
3. Id. at 14.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 23.
6. Id. at 25.
7. See id. at 28-29.
8. See id. at 29-30.
9. See id. at 32.
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comprehensive reform of federal bankruptcy law.' 0 One of the major
changes was the enlargement of the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction,
which allowed bankruptcy judges to hear almost all matters that arose or
were related to bankruptcy cases." Another change concerned fees paid
to lawyers and other professionals, which the 1898 Act had capped in
order to preserve economy. 12 "The drafters of the 1978 Act rejected the
economy principle, concluding that bankruptcy administration would be
better served if the best professionals were willing to serve in bankruptcy
cases. '13 Between 1978 and 1994 Congress conducted no major changes
but instead just tinkered with bankruptcy legislation.14
In 1994, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
which included a large number of substantive amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code.' 5 The Bankruptcy Reform Act amended the relevant
part of § 330 to read:
(a)(1) After notice to the parties in interest and the United States trustee
and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the court may
award to a trustee, an examiner, a professional person employed under
section 327 or 1103--(A) reasonable compensation for actual,
necessary services rendered by the trustee, examiner, professional
person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional person employed by
any such person; and (B) reimbursement for actual, necessary
expenses.
This amendment differed from the original statute because it took
out the term "or to the debtor's attorney" from the list of people who
may be awarded compensation. 17 Before the 1994 amendment debtors'
attorneys were allowed to collect their attorneys' fees from the debtors'
10.

See id.

11.
12.

See id. at 34.
See id. at 35.

13.

Id.

14. See id. at 37.
15. See id.at 42.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2000).
17. The statute originally stated that:
(a) After notice to any parties in interest and to the United States trustee and a hearing,
and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329 of this title, the court may award to a trustee, to
an examiner, to a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or
to the debtor's attorney-(l) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services
rendered by such trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney, as the case may be,
and by any paraprofessional persons employed by such trustee, professional person, or
attorney, as the case may be, based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such
services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than
in a case under this title.

II U.S.C. § 330 (1988).
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estate in Chapter 7, which deals with the liquidation of a bankruptcy
estate. 18 Chapter 7 establishes equitable distribution among the estates'
creditors, even though in most cases there are not enough assets to pay
off the creditors. 19 It also allows the honest debtor to obtain a new
financial life by allowing a discharge of all unpaid debts.20
A circuit split then emerged among five different circuit courts that
have addressed the issue of whether § 330 allows the debtor's attorney in
Chapter 7 cases to collect their fees from the bankruptcy estate. The
Third and Ninth circuits have found that the debtor's attorney is allowed
to recover fees from the debtor's estate. 21 They have taken a general
view that the omission of the words "or to debtor's attorney" in the
statute was inadvertent or the result of a scrivener's error.22 The Fourth,
Fifth and Eleventh circuits have taken the opposite position and have
said that attorneys are unable to collect their fees regardless of any
benefit from their legal services that have been provided to the estate.23
They rely on a strict reading of the statute, which does not have any
provision that allows for the awarding of fees.24
The Supreme Court of the United States then granted certiorari in
Lamie v. United States Trustee.25 The Court's recently stated opinion
holds that § 330(a)(1) does not authorize payment of attorney's fees to
the debtor's attorney unless that attorney was appointed under § 327 of
the code.26
This N6te will conduct an in-depth analysis into the decisions by
the Supreme Court and the circuit courts. The goal of this Note is to
suggest an approach for the Supreme Court to use when interpreting
unclear language under the Bankruptcy Code. It will examine how the
Supreme Court has examined this issue, as well as other issues of
statutory interpretation involving the Bankruptcy Code.
Part II of this Note will look at the cases that have decided that
attorneys should not be awarded their attorney fees from the debtor's
estate. It will examine the courts' reading of the statute and why it has
adopted a plain meaning approach as a solution to this issue.
18. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 1.03 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21.

See John J. Rapisardi, Bankruptcy Practice: Circuit Spilt Continue over Compensating

Ch. 7 Debtor'sAttorney, N.Y. L.J., July 18, 2002, at 3.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24.

See id.

25. 124 S. Ct. 1023 (2004).
26. See id. at 1027.
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Part III of this Note will explore the cases that have decided that
attorneys should be awarded their fees from the debtor's estate. It will
examine the courts' reading of the statute and why the courts feel that
the statute is ambiguous. It will address the issue of a possible
scrivener's error and will examine the legislative history of the
amendment. It will also examine the public policy arguments in favor of
allowing attorneys to collect their fees.
Part IV of this Note will look at using both a plain meaning
approach and legislative history to interpret the statute, focusing
primarily on how the Supreme Court has handled this situation in
bankruptcy cases. It will show that the Supreme Court has almost always
taken a plain meaning approach in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, but
in certain situations it has gone through the legislative history and looked
at policy reasons to decide the meaning of a statute. Part IV will also
explore any other options, such as retainers or liens, that an attorney may
use in order to collect their fees from a court that has adopted the plain
meaning of the statute.
Part V will offer the conclusion that the Supreme Court should
abandon its textual approach in deciding bankruptcy cases only when
there are overriding public policy concerns. It will make the assertion
that the Supreme Court underestimated the policy concerns that arise if
attorneys are not allowed to be compensated out of the debtor's estate. It
will provide the Supreme Court and future courts with a frarmework from
which to decide cases that include overwhelming policy concerns that
come before the court. This note will highlight the relationship between
this situation and the other situations where the Court has abandoned its
textualist approach in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code. Part V also
offers the solution that Congress should return § 330(a)(1) to its previous
form in order to provide debtor's attorneys in Chapter 7 cases to receive
their fees from the bankruptcy estate because this is the only solution
available after the Supreme Court's decision.
II. THE PLAIN MEANING APPROACH
(THE SUPREME COURT & CIRCUITS 4,5 & 11)
The plain meaning approach is when the court looks at the words of
the statute first instead of reverting to the legislative history to determine
the meaning of the statute.27 If the words of the statute are plain then the

27. See Adam J. Wiensch, Note, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of PreBankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEO. L. 1831, 1834 (1991).
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court will
enforce the statute according to the words used in the statute
28
only.
29

A. Lamie v. United States Trustee

This case came to the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 30 The bankruptcy attorney for
the debtor sough compensation for his legal services that were provided
to the debtor after the case was converted to a chapter 7 proceeding.
The attorney originally represented the debtor, Equipment Services, Inc.,
during a chapter 11 proceeding pursuant to § 327 with the approval of
the court.32 Three months into the proceeding the case was converted to a
chapter 7 case on motion from the United States Trustee.33 The attorney
continued to provide services to the3 4 debtor even though he did not have
the trustee's authorization to do So.
The Petitioner advanced the argument that § 330(a) contained a
scrivener's error, which mandated the Court look at the legislative
history of the statute and the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code as a
whole to determine the intent of Congress.3 5 The Petitioner argued that
Congress did not intend to eliminate the authority to compensate
debtors' attorneys and if they had intended to do that then the attempt
would have been made clear in the legislative history.36 Congress also
would not have made such a profound change without acknowledging
the change in the statutory history.37 The Petitioner also argues that
imposing a plain meaning reading of the statue would lead to absurd
results.38 There are several postpetition services that a debtor's attorney
28. See id. at 1834-35.
29. 124 S.Ct. 1023.
30. See id. at 1027.
31. See id. To find a full description of the facts surrounding the filing for bankruptcy and the
lower courts proceedings see infra Part 11. Sec. B.
32. See id. at 1029.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Br. for Pet'r at 16, Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 124 S. Ct. 1023 (2004) (No. 02-693).
36. See id. at 20, 25. There was no principle reason for the removal of the words "or to the
debtor's attorney" that appeared in the record of any debate. See id. They also advanced the theory
that do to the wide number of areas that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 covered, technical
errors were to be expected. See id. at 27.
37. See id. at 36. The Court has indicated that they "will not presume that Congress intended
to overturn an established bankruptcy rule sub silentio, but will instead require any intent to change
the law to be 'unmistakably clear."' Id. 36-37 (quoting Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 222
(1998)). Congress in the past has expressly authorized the payments of fees in these instances and
there is nothing in the history to show they intended such a change. See id. at 39.
38. See id. at 30.
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will commonly perform in a Chapter 7 proceeding and the possibility of
not having counsel may lead to increased errors. 39 Taking out
compensation also goes against the design of the statute, which was to
ensure comparable compensation for bankruptcy attorneys as opposed to
non-bankruptcy attorneys. 40 A plain reading of the statute may also cause
attorneys to pass on Chapter 11 cases for the fear that they may not be
compensated for their work if the case is converted to a Chapter 7
petition.41
The Respondent countered the Petitioner's arguments by stating
that the plain language of § 330(a)(1) does not authorize fees to be paid
to the debtor's attorney out of the bankruptcy estate.42 The deletion of the
term was intentional and that is evidenced by the fact that compensation
was made available to Chapter 12 and 13 attorneys' in the same statute.43
The reasoning behind this was to provide an incentive for debtors'
attorneys to educate their clients about the advantages of filing a Chapter
13 petition rather then a Chapter 7 petition. 44 Respondent also presented
that there is no statement or piece of legislative history that shows
Congress unquestionably wished for the debtors' attorneys to continue to
receive compensation from the estate. 45 Enforcing the plain language
reinforces policy objectives. 46 While the Code allows attorneys to be
awarded fees in Chapter 7 cases when appointed by the trustee, a case
under liquidation is fundamentally different and the goal of the trustee is
to maximize the estate, and the attorney can still receive payment either
from a pre-petition flat rate, post-petition funds from the debtor's own
pocket in an individual case or from the shareholders own pocket in a
corporate liquidation.47
The Court stated that the starting point in discerning Congress's
intent in a statute is the statutory text and not predecessor statutes. 48 It is
established that when a statute's language is plain, the court is to enforce

39. Seeid. at31.
40. See id. at 32.
41. Seeid. at33.
42. Br. for Resp'ts at 8, Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 124 S. Ct. 1023 (2004) (No.02-693).
43. See id. at 26.
44. See id. This is based on Senator Metzenbaum's view that Chapter 13 is the best overall
process for debtors but it is not that widespread throughout the country. See id. However, there was
no affirmative statement that the intention of Congress was to force attorneys to educate their client

by taking
45.
46.
47.
48.

away their fees.
Seeid. at31.
See id, at 33.
See id. at 34-37.
See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 124 S. Ct. 1024, 1030 (2004).
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the statute according to its terms. 49 The Court went on to hold that "[t]he
statute is awkward, and even ungrammatical; but that does not make it
ambiguous in the point at issue." 50 A debtor's attorney not engaged in
representing the debtor pursuant to § 327 is not included within the class
of persons eligible for compensation under § 330.
The Court then went on to address the awkward language in the
statute. It stated that the missing "or" does not change the Court's
conclusion as numerous federal statutes inadvertently lack a conjunction
and are read for their plain meaning. In this instance the conjunction
does not alter the substance of the text or obscure the meaning of the
statute.5 2 The Court also held that in subsection (A) the extra attorney
who falls under the category of people allowed to render compensable
services does not cloud the statute's meaning. 3 It is argued that
reference to attorney in § 330(a)(1)(A) refers to debtors attorneys in
§ 330(a)(1) because § 331 provides for debtors' attorneys and § 327
professional persons to receive compensation after an order of relief is
entered but before an application for § 330 is filed, even though
attorneys go unmentioned in § 330(a)(1). 54 The Court held that
§ 330(a)(1)(A) can be read in a straightforward manner as including
attorneys qualified as § 327 professional persons. 55 Under the Court's
reading of the text, "the word attorney in subsection (A) may well be
surplusage. ' 56 The Court states that "[s]urplusage does not always
produce ambiguity and our preference for avoiding surplusage
constructions is not absolute. 57 The Court here decides to read the word
attorney as surplusage because that would make the text unambiguous
and would allow the Court to "avoid the pitfalls that plague too quick a
58
turn to the more controversial realm of legislative history."
The Court went on to hold that the plain meaning of § 330(a)(1)
does not lead to absurd results.59 Compensation is still available to
debtors attorneys in Chapter 7 cases from estate funds through § 327 and
§ 330 when an attorney is appointed by the trustee and approved by the
court and that is the only way for a Chapter 7 attorney to receive fees
49. See id.
50. Id.
51.

See id.

52. See id.
53.

See id.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 1030-3 1.
Seeid. at l031.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
See id.
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from the estate. 60 This advances the trustees responsibility for preserving
the estate. 6 1 However, the Court also holds that § 330(a)(1) does not
prevent an attorney from receiving reasonable compensation in advance
of a Chapter 7 proceeding.62
The Court briefly commented on the legislative history finding that
they found the legislative history unnecessary to rely on because it
"creates more confusion then clarity about the congressional intent. 63
The Court addressed the argument that omitting the word attorney from
§ 330(a)(1) was a scrivener error and held that the deletion furthered a
reform by Congress to ensure that Chapter 7 debtors' attorneys would
not receive compensation without approval of the trustee. 64 They
supported this reasoning by stating that the National Association of
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys had the opportunity to object to the
deletion but did not, even though they were most likely to be affected by
the change. 65 That Act "followed by the Legislature's nonresponse66
should support a presumption of legislative awareness and intention.,
However, the Court is still unsure to Congress's intent in changing this
particular statute.67
B. In re Equipment Services, Inc. 68
Equipment Services retained counsel to represent them and prepare
a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 69 They paid counsel a $6,000 retainer, $1,000 of which was used
to pay the fees and filing costs of Chapter 11, while the other $5,000 was
placed in an escrow account to be drawn by the attorney as he earned
fees.70 On March 17, 1999, the proceeding was converted from a Chapter
11 to a Chapter 7 proceeding and a trustee was appointed to administer
the bankruptcy estate. 71 The attorney filed an application seeking
recovery of fees that were earned while representing Equipment Services
during the Chapter 7 proceeding.72 The trustee objected to the fee
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id. at 1031-32.
Seeid. at 1032.
See id. at 1031-32.
Id. at 1033.
See id.
See id. at 1034.
Id.
See id.
290 F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 2002).
See id. at 742.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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because it included compensation for services that occurred after the
case was converted and 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) "makes no provision for
counsel of the debtor to be compensated by the estate in a Chapter 7
proceeding.,73 The trustee also asserted that the application of fees did
not state what benefit the estate had received that was distinct from the
work the attorney provided Equipment Services.74 The bankruptcy court
agreed with the trustee that the debtor's attorney is not allowed to
receive funds for services from the bankruptcy estate after the case is
converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding, but held that the "prepetition
retainer held by [the attorney] was property of the bankruptcy estate only
to the extent that it exceeded the total fees allowed to the debtor's
counsel for all services rendered in the case, including all services
rendered after the Chapter 7 conversion." 75 The matter was appealed to
the district court by the trustee and the attorney cross-appealed the part
of the ruling that prohibited the debtor from obtaining compensation
from a Chapter777 estate.76 The district court then affirmed the bankruptcy
court's ruling.

The Fourth Circuit held that all fees the attorney earned before the
conversion of the case were allowed but any fees earned after the case
was converted from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 proceeding were
disallowed because of the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 330.78 The
court, while noting the circuit split, determined that they "should follow
the plain language of the 1994 version of § 330(a), particularly because
application of that plain language supports a reasonable interpretation of
the Bankruptcy Code., 79 The statute now clearly omits the prior
authorization for the debtor's attorney to collect fees from the Chapter 7
estate. 8° The reference to attorney in the second part of the statute does
not make the statute ambiguous. 81 "'[A] professional person employed
under section 327 or 1103, [of U.S.C. § 330], could be the antecedent to
'attorney' as used in the [pre-1994 statute], because the trustee is
authorized to hire an attorney as a professional person."'' 82 Section 327
states "'the trustee, with the court's approval, may employ one or more
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 742-43 (internal quotations omitted).
See id. at 743.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 747.
Id.at 745.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional
persons ... to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's
duties under this title.' '' 83 "While the reference in § 330(a)(1)(A) to
'attorney' may be superfluous, it does not render the statute
ambiguous." 84 The court held that the omission of the word "or" after the
word "examiner" in the statute was an "oversight that is . . . consistent
with the deliberate deletion of the words '[or to] debtor's attorney' as it
is with the inadvertent deletion of those words from that section[;]
[t]hus,
85
ambiguous."
language
the
render
not
does
[the] oversight
The court presumes that Congress intended what it said when it
deleted the provision awarding attorneys fees for the debtor attorney
from § 330.86 "When a statute is unambiguous, canons of construction
prevent us from considering outside sources, such as legislative history,
to attempt to discern what Congress may or may not have intended to
do." 87 The court then goes on to state that the current version of the
statute has been in effect for eight years and Congress has not addressed
the issue of whether it made a scrivener's error with the 1994
amendments. 8 The court concludes that "[i]f Congress did indeed make
an error, the error should be corrected by Congress, not by [this court
and since] the plain language.., is unambiguous and is reasonable in
89
application, we are constrained to enforce the language as written.,
The court then awarded the attorney his fees for the amount charged
while working on the proceedings during the Chapter 11 part of the
case.90 However, the court held that after the case was converted to
Chapter 7 the remaining amount of money left in the retainer escrow
became part of the debtor's estate; thus, the attorney could not recover
his fees from the escrow account because of § 330(a). 9'
The court, though, noted some of the trustee policy arguments
supporting the 1994 change in the statute. The trustee first points out that
83. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2000).
84. Equip. Servs., 290 F.3d at 745.
85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. See id.
87. Id. (citing In re Am. Steel Prod., Inc., 197 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11 th Cir. 1999); Pro-Snax
Distribs., Inc. v. Family Snack, Inc., 157 F.3d 414, 425 (5th Cir. 1998)).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 745-46.
90. See id. at 747.
91. See id. In order to determine property interests like Equipment Services' at the time it filed
its petition courts generally look to state law. Here the state law of Virginia applies, which is the law
of contracts dealing with fee arrangements between lawyers and their clients. Virginia law and
disciplinary rules require an attorney to hold the type of retainer that was held in this case in a trust.
See id. at 746.
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in Chapter 7 proceedings unlike Chapters 11, 12, and 13 the creditors
and debtors do not act like a team.92 The trustee asserts that in Chapter 7
cases, the trustee is allowed "to hire attorneys at estate expense as
needed to help liquidate the estate, negating the need for the assistance
of the debtor's attorney., 93 Also, in a Chapter 7 proceeding the debtor's
attorney cannot do the type of work that would enlarge an estate in a
Chapter 11 case because a Chapter 7 proceeding is a zero-sum game.94
The court found that that argument was based on the fact that unlike a
Chapter 11 proceeding, where the debtor in-possession is the trustee of
the estate, in Chapter 7 proceedings the debtor and the trustee are
distinct. 95 "In sum... Congress deliberately, and for good reason,
excluded the debtor's [estate] ...in a Chapter 7 proceeding. 96
C. In re American Steel Product, Inc.97
American Steel Product was placed in involuntary Chapter 7 by its
creditors. 98 The bankruptcy court converted it to a Chapter 11 proceeding
and then reconverted it back to a Chapter 7.99 At the end of the
proceedings the law firm submitted a fee for compensation of services in
the amount of $30,141.87.1°° As part of the fee, $19,600.00 had been
paid as part of a retainer. °l The bankruptcy court originally awarded the
fee but reserved ruling on whether it could come from the bankruptcy
estate.102 After looking at authority concerning the issue, they vacated
their prior order and decided not to allow attorney fees to be taken out of
the estate.' 0 3 The bankruptcy court based its decision on the plain
language of § 330.104
The circuit court followed the district court's ruling in stating that
"the plain reading of the [statute] precludes an award of attorney's fees

92. See id. at 744.
93. Id. at 744-45.
94. See id. at 745.
95. See id.
96. Id. The court continues to state that the Trustee's argument is supported by two cases: In
re Am. Steel Prod., Inc., 197 F.3d 1354 (11 th Cir. 1999) and In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc., 157 F.3d
414 (5th Cir. 1998).
97. 197 F.3d 1354 (11 th Cir. 1999).
98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at 1355.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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to a debtor's attorney in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 proceeding."'' 0 5 The
court then goes on to say that:
It is well-settled that courts are required to apply the plain meaning

canon of statutory construction in interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Code. "[A]s long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,
there generally is no need
106 for a court to inquire beyond the plain
language of the statute."

The court found that the statute is textually clear and since the plain
meaning is conclusive
they should not award attorney fees from the
07
estate.
debtor's
The court then notes the split among the circuits and holds that the
unambiguous language of the statute ends the discussion and since the
statutory language is plain, the court's sole function is to enforce the
language according to its terms. 10 8 The court concludes its decision by
stating that "[m]oreover, this case does not present compelling
circumstances which warrant departure from this general rule."' 0 9 This
leaves open the idea that even though the Eleventh Circuit abides by the
plain meaning of the statute, they may be open to interpretation of the
legislative history or a different reading of the statute if certain
compelling circumstances existed. It could be argued that since this case
is similar to most cases that arise under § 330 the compelling
circumstances the court speaks of would never exist. However, this
suggests that the court may be looking for a sympathetic case in order to
trump their reading of the statute.
D. In re Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc. v. Family Snack, Inc.

10

On August 10, 1995, the creditors filed an involuntary petition
under Chapter 7.11 The debtor consented to relief and converted the
proceeding to Chapter 11.112 Prior to the filing of the involuntary petition
and through the conversion to Chapter 11 the law firm of Andrews &
Kurth ("A&K") provided legal services. 13 The bankruptcy court:

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1356.
Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
See id.
See id.
at 1356-57.
Id.at 1357.
157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998).
Seeid. at416.
See id.
See id.
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After acknowledging that 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) provides an
administrative priority (i.e., over unsecured creditors) for fees awarded
under 11 U.S.C. § 330, ... concluded-on the basis of extensive
findings on the record-that A&K could be awarded compensation
from the bankruptcy estate under § 330(a)(1) for work done as11"the
4
debtor's attorney" after the appointment of the Chapter 11 trustee.

The bankruptcy court noted that the current version of the statute
did not explicitly provide for an award of fees but concluded that the
statute was vague and did not preclude an award of compensation
towards A&K.115 The bankruptcy court was reluctant to interpret vague
statutory language, which would cause a major change in bankruptcy
practice that was not the subject of some discussion in the legislative
history. 11 6 The bankruptcy court [awarded fees based] on the standard
that "'has evolved to determine when an attorney should be allowed
compensation from the estate.""' 7 The court held that "an attorney's
work must benefit the estate before compensation is payable, and that
any fee request should be reduced for work that is duplicative of the
trustee's efforts; obstructs or impedes the administration of the estate; or
is inconsistent with the debtor's duties."' 1 8 The court concluded that
A&K benefited the estate in the areas 9of business operations, claims
objections and liquidation of inventory."
The district court then reversed the bankruptcy court's holding
stating that § 330 "does not include an explicit provision allowing fees to
a 'debtor's attorney'--cannot sustain an award to A&K for work done as
114. Id. at 417. (quoting In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc., 204 B.R. 492,495-97 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1996)). The pertinent part of § 503 reads:
(a) An entity may timely file a request for payment of an administrative expense, or may
tardily file such request if permitted by the court for cause. (b) After notice and a
hearing, there shall be allowed, administrative expenses, other than claims allowed under
section 502(0 of this title, including--(1) (A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of
preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered
after the commencement of the case; (B) any tax--(i) incurred by the estate, except a tax
of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of this title; or (ii) attributable to an excessive
allowance of a tentative carryback adjustment that the estate received, whether the
taxable year to which such adjustment relates ended before or after the commencement
of the case; and (C) any fine, penalty, or reduction in credit relating to a tax of a kind
specified in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph; (2) compensation and reimbursement
awarded under section 330(a) of this title; (3) the actual, necessary expenses, other than
compensation and reimbursement specified in paragraph ....
II U.S.C. § 503 (2000).
115. See Pro-Snax Distribs., 157 F.3d at 417-18.
116. Seeid.at418.
117. Id. (quoting Pro-SnaxDistribs., Inc., 204 B.R. at 496).
118. Id.
119. See id. at419.
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'counsel for the debtor.' ' 120 The court relied on the American Rule of
attorney's fees; and the only indication that Congress intended to set
aside the American Rule was in the previous
language of § 330(a),
121
which explicitly allowed for attorneys fees.
The circuit court affirmed the district court's ruling that the plain
meaning of the statute was controlling. 122 The court started its
examination by looking at the plain meaning of the statute. 123 The
reading of the statute begins and ends their inquiry stating that "' [i]n the
absence of any ambiguity, our examination is confined to the words
of
124
the statute, which are assumed to carry their ordinary meaning."",
The court held that § 330 excludes attorneys from its list of people
who can be compensated for their work from a bankruptcy estate after
the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. 125 The court then stated that
"[a]lthough the legislative history and.., a brief syntactical evaluation
of the clause. .. suggest that Congress inadvertently neglected to
include attorneys, our canons of construction do not require [or] permit
us to consider ... exogenous sources when the statute is clear textually
on its face."' 126 The court found that the omission of the word "or" in the
1994 Amendments made the sentence read awkwardly,
but the omission
127
did not change the meaning of the words around it.
In following the circuit's "cardinal canon of statutory construction"
the court held that it must presume that what Congress intended to say in
the statute they did and that by deleting the term or "'to the debtor's
attorney' they meant to disallow compensation for the debtor's attorney
from the estate. 128 The court then stated that even if the legislative
history showed that Congress intended to leave the language of the

120. Id.
121.

See id. The American Rule of attorney's fees states that generally attorney's fees are not a

recoverable part of litigation absent explicit congressional authorization but the courts and Congress
have developed exceptions to this rule for situations where overriding considerations dictate the
need for an awarding of fees. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of
Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 608 (2001); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 39192 (1970).
122. See Pro-SnaxDistribs., Inc., 157 F.3d at 426.
123. See id. at 425.
124. Id. (quoting Stanford v. C.I.R. 152 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 1998)).
125.
126.

See id.
Id.

127. See id. at 425 n.14. The court signifies that the admission to an ordinary reader not
familiar with the circumstance would mean that Congress just forgot the word "or" before the
phrase "a professional person" and not that the entire phrase "to the debtor's attorney" was missing.
See id.

128. Id.
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statute intact, the statute as it now appears is unambiguous. 129 This court

has held in another decision regarding the Bankruptcy Code that "where
one party's argument finds 'express support' in the legislative
is 'clearly contrary to the statutory language,' it is
history... [that]
'unpersuasive. ' ' ' 130 The court relied on Justice Scalia's interpretation of
the Bankruptcy Code that states "'as long as the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire
beyond the plain language of the statute.""' 131 The court determined that
the statute did not include the phrase "to the debtor's attorney" so there
as written, attorneys are not to receive fees from
can be no dispute that
32
the debtor's estate.'

III.

DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION
(CIRCUITS

3 & 9)

Dynamic interpretation usually occurs when the statutory language
is ambiguous. 133 When a statute is ambiguous or its result would lead to
an absurd or impractical result most courts will look to the legislative
34
history in order to determine what the statute was intended to mean.
The legislative history gives one an idea of what the goals of the people
who wrote
the statute were and possibly what they wanted the statute to
5
say.1

3

136
A. In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc.

Top Grade originally filed for a Chapter 11 proceeding in order to
reorganize its business. 137 The Chapter 11 proceeding was then
converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding after the reorganization plan proved
to be unsuccessful. 138 The bankruptcy court awarded fees reasoning that
in order for a debtor's attorney to receive compensation from the estate
the attorney must provide services that are beneficial to the estate and

129. See id.
130. Id. (quoting Gamble v. Gamble, 143 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1998)).
131. Id. at 426 (quoting BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 566 (1994)).
132. See id.
133. See Eric W. Lam, The Limit and Inconsistency of Application of the Plain Meaning Rule
to Selected Provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 20 HAMLINE L. REv. 111, 112-13
(1996).
134. See id.
135. See Wiensch, supranote 27, at 1836-37.
136. 227 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2000).
137. See id. at 125.
138. See id. at 126.
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not duplicative of the services rendered by the trustee. 139 The district
court affirmed the ruling stating that "despite the omission of 'debtor's
attorney' from the amended language of the statute, services by a
debtor's attorney which benefit the estate are compensable 14and
that the
0
omission from the language of § 330(a)(1) was inadvertent."'
The circuit court agreed with the district court and found that the
current version of the statute when read to omit "debtor's attorney" is
ambiguous and inconsistent with other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. 141 The court held that
the omission of the phrase makes section
142
inconsistent.
330 internally
The [section] begins by delineating those officers to whom the District
Court may award payments .... [D]ebtor's attorney is no longer
included in the first list[,] [b]ut when the sentence continues at
subsection (a)(l)(A), the list of potential fee recipients is unchanged
from the previous version of the subsection .... As § 330 now reads
then, the second half43 of the sentence seems to partially permit what the
first half prohibits. 1

The court then discusses the inconsistency that is created by the use
of the definitive article "the" rather than the indefinite articles "a," "'an,"
or "any" to modify the officers listed in § 330(a)(1)(A). 144 The Court
cites Webster's Dictionary as defining "the" as 'a function word to
indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or has been
previously specified by context or by circumstance."",145 The court then
cites Black's Law Dictionary as stating that "'[i]n construing [a] statute,
definite article 'the' particularizes the subject which it precedes and is
word of limitation as opposed to indefinite or generalizing force 'a' or
'an'."" 4 6 This would mean that the use of the word "'the' in
§ 330(a)(1)(A) then refers to the universe of officers listed in § 330(a)(1)
which would leave the word "attorney" in § 330(a)(1)(A) without prior
reference."'' 47 Courts are obliged to give effect to every word Congress
used in construing the statute. 14 Interpreting the statute under a plain
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See id.
Id. at 127.
Seeid. at128.
See id.
Id. at 128-29 (internal quotations omitted).
See id. at 129.
145. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1222 (1989)).
146. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (6th ed. 1990)).
147. See id.
148. See id. The court cites In re Cohen, 54 F.3d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1995) for the proposition
that "[c]ourts are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used."
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reading would not give any effect to the word attorney in § 330(a)(1)(A).
This reading of the statute makes it ambiguous, which would mean that
recourse to the legislative history of the statute is necessary.
The court then states that the inclusion of the word attorney in
§ 330(a)(1)(A) works together with § 330(a)(4)(B). 149 "If § 330(a)(4)(B)
is read without reference to the entire text of § 330(a)(4), it could be read
to provide a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 debtor's attorney a right to an
award not shared by that attorney's peers.' 50 If the two sections are read
together it is clear that Congress did not intend to do that.' 5' Section
330(a)(4)(A) seeks to assure services that are unique, necessary or
reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate while section
330(a)(4)(B) sets forth a liberal standard for attorneys in Chapter 12 or
13 cases.1 52 Even though the statute applies different standards for
compensation it does
not mean that one group can be compensated while
153
the other can not.
Indeed, recognition by Congress that this discrete class of debtors'
attorneys need to be excepted from the regular, more stringent
standards for compensation evidences Congress's belief that debtors'
attorneys in general remained eligible for compensation under the
customary standard. To then read § 330 to preclude eligibility would
create a glaring inconsistency in the Bankruptcy Code. 154
The statutory scheme would be inconsistent if section 330 is read to
omit debtor's attorney and "'[the] Court has been reluctant to accept
arguments that would interpret the Code, however vague the particular
language under consideration might be, to effect a major change in preCode practice that is
not the subject of at least some discussion in the
1 55
history."
legislative
In light of these arguments the court held that compensation of the
debtor's attorney is still allowed under the statute because of the
ambiguous nature of the statute and the fact that the legislative history
149. See id. at 129. Section 330(a)(4)(B) states that:
In a chapter 12 or chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the court may
allow reasonable compensation to the debtor's attorney for representing the interests of
the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy case based on the consideration of the
benefit and necessity of such services to the debtor and other factors set forth in this
section.
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B) (200o).
150. In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc., 227 F.3d at 130.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1992)).
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to change the long-standing
does not show a specific intent by Congress 156
attorneys.
debtors'
compensating
of
tradition
157
B. In re Century Cleaning Services, Inc.

In this case, Central Cleaning Services filed for a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding and the law firm of Garvey, Schubert & Barer
("Garvey") acquired a retainer and were appointed counsel. 58 The
proceeding was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding and the court
appointed a trustee.159 Garvey stayed on as counsel but never requested a
reappointment after the conversion of the case. 160 The bankruptcy court
held that the Bankruptcy Code did not allow payment of fees to the
debtor's attorney under the statute because the 1994 amendments to the
statute omitted attorneys from the list of professionals eligible to receive
compensation from the debtor's estate. 16 1 The court held though that
Garvey had a valid state lien on the property because of the retainer and
would be able to recover reasonable fees and was awarded
$10,568.37.162 The trustee appealed this ruling to the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel, which affirmed the fees awarded by the bankruptcy
court based on the state lien theory but denied compensation under
§ 330.163

In order to understand the issue that was presented before the circuit
court the court first looks at the reasoning behind the changes to the
Bankruptcy Code. 16 4 Prior to the passage of the 1994 amendment
attorneys were clearly allowed to receive compensation from the
estate. 165 Prior to the 1994 amendment the first sentence of § 330
included attorneys in both places of where the statute set forth the list of
people eligible to receive compensation. 166 "The Reform Act amended
§ 330(a) extensively, adding, among other things, more detailed
guidance about how a court should determine the reasonableness of fee
requests."' 167 After the amendments the statute did not include "debtor's
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See id.
195 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 1054.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1055.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1056.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss2/5

18

Hinde: The International Environmental Court: Its Broad Jurisdiction as

20031

DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CHAPTER 7

attorney," where it originally appeared, in the first list of people who
were able to receive compensation, but did include it in the second place
where "attorney" originally appeared. 168 Now "on the face of the statute
the list of persons to whom the court 'may award' payments is different
from the list of persons to whom the court may provide 'reasonable
compensation.'169
The circuit court held that "[a] careful examination of § 330(a)(1)
reveals an unavoidable and substantial ambiguity, which stems from ' an
170
internal conflict between two different portions of a single sentence."
The sentence does not include "attorneys" in the section that lists the
people that the court may award payments to but includes "attorneys" in
the portion that allows for reasonable compensation. 171 The court
concludes that the statutory language is ambiguous and that Congress
made a drafting error of some kind. 172 In closely examining the statutory
language the court found an error because the conjunction "or" does not
appear before the last category of people who may be awarded fees, the
"professional person.' 73 "The absence of this conjunction shows, at the
least, that some error was made in the drafting of the provision at
issue. ,,174
The finding of the drafting error led the court into an inquiry as to
whether Congress meant to exclude attorneys from the first list or
include them in the second list. 175 The court then examines the
legislative history behind the amendment to section 330 because the
conflicting placement of attorneys in the statute renders the statute
ambiguous. 76 During debate on the Reform Act the statute was
introduced to the Senate with attorneys included in both lists, the same
way the statute originally read.1 77 The statute also included a provision
168. See id.
169. Id.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 1057.
See id.
See id.

173. See id. at 1058. In order for the sentence to be grammatically correct the word "or" would
have to appear before professional person.
174. Id.
175.

See id.

176.
177.

See id.
at 1058 n.5.
See id. The initial version of the Reform Act read:

(1) After notice to the parties in interest and the United States trustee and a hearing, and

subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the court may award to a trustee, an examiner, a
professional person employed under section 327 or 1103, or to the debtor's attorney,
after considering comments and objections submitted by the United States Trustee in
conformance with guidelines adopted by the Executive Office for United States Trustees
pursuant to section 586(a)(3)(A) of title 28--(A) reasonable compensation for actual,
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that considered objections from the United States Trustee in the
awarding of fees which were removed by an amendment introduced by
Senator Metzenbaum. 178 This amendment became part of the text of the
79
final legislation and deleted "debtor's attorney" from § 330(a)(1).1
"Debtor's attorney" was not the only relevant change to the statute, nor
was it the fundamental purpose of the amendment. 180 The fundamental
purpose of the amendment was to "consolidate, in a newly created
subsection, the newly drafted language in § 330(a)(1) allowing for
objections by the U.S. Trustee with another provision that also discussed
objections to fee awards."' 181 In order to improve the organization of the
statute and eliminate any potential redundancies 18
the
discussions of
2
objections were eliminated and placed in § 330(a)(2).
The language that provided for objections in the amendment, which
were removed for reorganization purposes, happened to be placed
immediately after the words "debtor's attorney" even though the subject
matters were unrelated. 183 "Thus, the material deleted consisted solely of
the newly added language that was moved to a new subsection plus the
four unrelated words that directly preceded it. Unfortunately, those four
words happened to be 'or to a debtor's attorney.' ' 184 A likely occurrence
was that the author of the amendment might have crossed out too many
words when trying to delete the part regarding trustee objections. 85 The
error could have easily been overlooked because it was "part of a
revision that appeared simply to restore then-existing law by eliminating
proposed new procedure.' 86
The likelihood that the deletion was inadvertent is further advanced
by three other things one would expect to find if the deletion had been
deliberate.1 87 There is an absence of any effort to change the list of
necessary services rendered by the trustee, examiner, professional person or attorney and
by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person; and (B) reimbursement
for actual, necessary expenses.
S.540, 103d Cong. § 309, 140 Cong. Rec. § 4405-06 (1994).
178. See In re Century Cleaning Servs., Inc., 195 F.3d at 1059.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182.

See id.

183. See id. "The material the amendment actually deleted.., was as follows: or the debtor's
attorney, after considering comments and objections submitted by the United States Trustee in
conformance with guidelines adopted by the Executive Office for United States Trustees pursuant to
section 586(a)(3)(A) of title 28[.]" Id.
184. Id.
185. See id.at 1060.
186. id.
187. See id.
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people awarded reasonable compensation to match the list of people the
court is allowed to award payments to.' 88 The second is the missing "or"

before the last person allowed to receive compensation.18 9 Third, if the
deletion were deliberate one would expect to find some evidence in the
legislative history that Congress intended to do this since it was a
substantive change to the Bankruptcy Code.' 90 Here, there is no history
to indicate that Congress intended to remove "debtor's attorney" and in
the absence of any legislative history that shows Congress intended a
change, courts will ordinarily refuse "to find that ambiguous
statutory
9
language significantly alters an existing statutory scheme."' '
Prior to the amendment courts were clearly allowed to compensate
attorneys from the debtors' estate. 92 The absence of any discussion to
change the policy behind the statute in the legislative history strongly
suggest that Congress did not intend to delete "debtor's attorneys" or to
make any substantive changes to that part of the statute. 193 Policy

considerations also favor awarding fees to debtors' attorneys because the
attorneys do perform several post-petition services necessary in the
administration of the estate and eliminating the possibility of
compensation would alter the ability of debtors to secure counsel to
perform these services, which would mean "a fundamental change in
bankruptcy law."' 94 The court concludes"
[That] the history of the Bankruptcy Code, the legislative history of the
Reform Act, and applicable policy considerations all point toward the
same conclusion: the drafting error in the Reform Act lies in the
deletion of 'attorney' for95the first list in § 330(a)(1), not the retention of
that term in the second. 1

188. See id.
189. See id. If Congress deliberately changed the statute itwould seem reasonable to think they
would have inserted an "or" before professional person. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 1060-61. Examples of post-petition services that counsel may provide are filing of
the conversion petition, prepared schedules, amended reports, or a statement of affairs. See id.
195. Id. at 1061.
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TEXTUALISM: PLAIN MEANING AND INTERPRETING LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY

A.

PlainMeaning

Textualism looks at the language and structure of a statute as the
basis of determining Congress's intent in enacting the law.'96 Most
textualist study is done by looking towards the plain meaning, which
"requires that 'the meaning of the statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain...97
the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.""
There is a constitutional justification for the plain meaning rule.' 98 The
Constitution separates power into three separate branches and reserves
the power of making legislation solely to the legislative branch.' 99 Since
members of Congress are only expressing their opinion they are not
making law according to the prescribed method of lawmaking set forth
in the Constitution. 200 Secondly, the plain meaning approach is also
justified for pragmatic reasons. 20 1 If a party uses legislative history, it is
argued that the user examines the statute knowing what he or she is
seeking in order to force the decision towards their view. 20 2 This is a
valid consideration in bankruptcy because "[t]he legislative history of
the Bankruptcy Code is particularly susceptible to misuse because the
Code's history spans a ten-year period encompassing many
modifications to its language. 20 3 By not using the plain language of the
statute a court may misinterpret the Code and come up with a decision
that was not the intention of the drafters.
However, the plain meaning rule is not always followed by the
Supreme Court. There are three major decisions that are often used to
show examples of when the Court has not used the plain meaning
approach. 20 4 These cases show the rationale that the Court uses to
support an outcome that is different from the plain meaning of the
196. See Wienseh, supra note 27, at 1834.
197. Id. (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
198. See id. at 1835.
199. See id.
200.
201.

See id.
See id.

202. See id. at 1836.
203. Id.
204. See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 11 (1997). The three cases are Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978), Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), and United
Steelworkers ofAmerica, AFL-CIO-CLCv. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See id.
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statute. 20 5 These cases all demonstrate the tension between the use of a
plain meaning approach and the preferences of the Court in seeking
different outcomes.20 6
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,207 a near completed federally
funded dam was stopped because workers found a snail that was
considered an endangered species.20 8 The Endangered Species Act of
1973 required the Court to enjoin the building of a dam when the
Secretary of the Interior determined that the operation of the dam would
destroy the endangered species. 20 9 The Court relied on the plain meaning
of the statute and found that construction on the dam must be stopped.2 10
However, it is the dissent's argument in this case that gives a good
example of not applying the plain meaning of the statute. 2 1' The dissent
argues that it is not possible that Congress meant the act to produce such
an "absurd result" to a project that was nearly completed.212 It goes on to
state that "where the statutory language and legislative history ... need
not be construed to reach such a result ... it [is] the duty of this Court to
adopt a permissible construction that accords with some modicum of
common sense and the public weal. 2 13
A good example of the Court not following the plain meaning of
the statute is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.2 14 This case
dealt with a statute that disallowed people from bringing immigrants into
the United States to perform labor of any kind.2 15 Here, the Church tried
to bring in a pastor to perform services. 1 6 The Court held that the
Church was allowed to have the pastor work there even though it is
against the plain meaning of the statute.2 17 The Court stated that "[i]t is a
familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers. 218

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See id.
See id.
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
See id. at 158-61.
See id. at 172-73.
See id. at 194.
See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 204, at 12.
See Tennessee Valley, 437 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id.
143 U.S. 457 (1892).
Seeid. at458.

216. Seeid.
217. Seeid. at459.
218. Id.
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A third case that is cited when offering the proposition not to follow
the plain meaning is United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber.219 This case challenged the legality of an affirmative action plan
that reserves fifty percent of the openings in training programs for black
people until the amount of black people in the plant is equal to the
amount of black people in the local labor force. 220 The question is
whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to the private
221
sector in making these race conscious choices to include minorities.
The Court held that Title VII did not prohibit such affirmative action
plans.2 2 Title VII prohibited employers or organizations from
discriminating against any individual for race, color, religion, sex or
national origin in any program established to provide apprenticeship or
other training, 223 The complaint alleged that junior black employees
were getting training over senior white employees, thus discriminating
against the white employees.224 The Court held that no such
discrimination took place because finding discrimination would be based
on a literal interpretation of the statute.225 The purpose of this statute is
"an affirmative action plan voluntarily adopted by private parties to
eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation." 226 The Court then
cited the principle of Holy Trinity and found that the statute must be read
against the background of the legislative history of Title VII. 22 7 The

Court concludes that looking at the statute this way would bring an end
to the complete purpose of the statute.228
After finding that the plain meaning of a statue does not apply a
court will then turn towards legislative history in order to determine the
meaning of the statute.
B. InterpretingLegislative History
There are two tools that are used when the court does not follow the
plain meaning of the statute. A court can either use canons of
construction or they can use legislative history. 229 "Canons of
219.

443 U.S. 193 (1979).

220. See id. at 197.
221. See id.
222.
223.

See id.
See id. at 200 nn. 1-3.

224. See id. at 199.
225.

See id. at 201.

226. Id.
227.
228.
229.

See id.
See id. at 202.
See MIKVA & LANE, supranote 204, at 23.
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construction are judicially crafted maxims for determining the meaning
of statutes. ' '230 Legislative history involves examining the steps that the
legislature goes through in order to pass the statute.231
Scholars have generally looked down on the use of canons of
construction for two reasons.23 2 "[F]irst, that canons are not a coherent,
shared body of law from which correct answers can be drawn, and,
second, that, viewed individually, many canons are wrong., 233 It is also
said that canons are individual rules that a judge can use to support his or
her view of the case and that for every canon one can use, there is an
equal and totally opposite canon that can be used for the other side.234
Despite the criticism of canons, many are still used by judges as tools for
interpretation, particularly when the legislative history is slim or not
easily accessible. 235 Legislative history is a more accurate determination
of the intent of the legislature because one 236
is examining what actually
occurred during the enactment of the statute.
A court will generally reach its decision to-use legislative history
when the meaning of the statute is ambiguous or clouded, or if the
construction of a clear statute leads to an absurd result or impracticable
consequence.237 A statute is usually unclear for one of several reasons.
First, is that words can be understood differently by different
audiences. 8 Second, statutes are usually drafted in general terms that
address categories of conduct and no matter how carefully it was drafted
a dispute to how it is applied in certain fact patterns may occur. 239 Also,
legislatures may use general language so that the general language can
be further defined by agencies. 24 0 Fourth, statutes can be unclear because
of compromises in the legislature to get the necessary votes in order for

230. Id.
231. Seeid. at28.
232. See id. at 25.
233. Id.
234. See id. An example of this type of canon is "'[a] statute cannot go beyond its text' except
'[t]o effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text."' See id. (quoting Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How
Statutes Are toBe Construed,3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950)).
235. See id. at 27.
236. See id. at29. Certain criticism has been directed at legislative history because of the
overuse of it over the past several decades. It has also been criticized for not following the
democratic process and for its reliability because people can plant legislative history by making
certain speeches to get on the record. See id. at 30-3 1.
237. SeeLam, supranote 133, at 112-13.
238. See MIKVA & LANE, supranote 204, at 20.
239. See id.
240. See id.
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the statute to pass. 24 1 Lastly, a statute can be ambiguous because the
legislature did not give sufficient thought to the words of the statute or
the questions that could be litigated.2 42
A court will also look to the legislative history when the reading of
the plain language of the statute will lead to a decision that is
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute or because the court does not
agree with the policy outcome that the plain meaning dictates.2 43 When
looking towards legislative history the court should examine any
legislative materials that accompany the statute including any
discussions that bear a significant relationship to the enactment
process. 244 The legislative history of a statute gives insight into what
decisions were made in enacting the statute and also what some of the
goals were of the people working on the statute. "[T]he Court has
frequently looked to the legislative history ... to ensure that its decision
is not 'demonstrably
at odds with the intentions of [the Code's]
245
drafters.'
"The Court has been remarkably consistent in deciding Bankruptcy
Code cases in that, almost without exception, it has used a textualist
approach for statutory interpretation., 246 The textualist approach in
bankruptcy cases "is supported by the character of the Bankruptcy Code,
the nature of [the] bankruptcy, and the Court's narrow view of the
equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts. 247 However, in two cases the
Supreme Court has abandoned the traditional textualist approach and
instead relied on public policy and pre-Code law.24 8 The two case are
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental
250
249
Protection and Kelly v. Robinson.
1. MidlanticNational Bank
Midlantic National Bank involved the question of whether section
554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in bankruptcy to
abandon property in contravention of state laws or regulations that are
241.

See id.

242. See id. at 22.
243. See id. at 10.
244. See id. at 36. The authors then suggest a rough pecking order of legislative history as
follows: 1. Committee reports (including conference reports); 2. Markup transcripts; 3. Committee
debates and hearing transcripts; and 4. Transcripts of floor debates. See id.
245. Wiensch, supra note 27, at 1836-37.
246. Id. at 1832.
247. Id. at 1863.
248. See id. at 1832-33.
249. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
250. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
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designed to protect the public's safety or health.251 Section 554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the
estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value
and benefit to the estate. 252
In Midlantic, Quanta Resources Corporation ("Quanta") processed
two waste oil facilities, one in Long Island City, New York and the other
in Edgewater, New Jersey. 253 In June 1981, Quanta acquired a $600,000
loan secured by its inventory, accounts receivable and certain other
equipment from Midlantic National Bank. 4 Shortly after the loan it was
discovered that Quanta had violated a prohibition in its operating permit
by accepting over 400,000 gallons of contaminated oil.2 55 Quanta was

to
ordered by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 256
site.
the
of
cleanup
begin
to
then
and
Edgewater
at
operations
cease
Quanta, which was in financial trouble filed for Chapter 2 I517
reorganization that was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation.
After filing for bankruptcy it was discovered that Quanta had also stored
toxic chemicals at their Long Island site.258 Since the mortgages on the
facility's real property were more than the value of the properties, the
cost of disposing the waste would render the property a burden on the
estate.2 59 After unsuccessfully trying to sell the Long Island property to
benefit Quanta's creditors, the trustee notified the court that he intended
to abandon the property pursuant to § 554(a).260
The City and State of New York opposed the abandonment of the
property because it would threaten the public's health and safety, as well
as violate state and federal environmental laws. 26 1 The state asked that
the assets of the company be used to bring the land into compliance with
the applicable law.262 The bankruptcy court approved the abandonment
and held that the state was in a better position to protect the public's

251. Seeid. at496.
252. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (a) (2000).
253. See Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 496-97.
254. See id. at 497.

255. See id.
256. See id.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.The same process occurred with the Edgewater, New Jersey property shortly after

a district court ruling approved the abandonment of the New York property. Since the abandonment
of both facilities raised identical issues a direct appeal to the circuit court was allowed. See id. at
498-99.
at 498.
261. See id.
262. See id.
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health from the toxic chemicals than the trustee or the debtor.263 The
state and city then appealed and the circuit court held that Congress had
intended to codify the judge-made abandonment practice developed
under the previous Bankruptcy Act even though there was little
legislative history to guide it. 264 Under the previous law, "where state
law or general equitable principles protected certain public interests,
those interests were not overridden by the judge-made abandonment
power." 265 The Supreme Court going against
the plain language of the
266
statute affirmed the circuit court's ruling.
Before the revision of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 the power of
the trustee to abandon property had been limited by the judicially
developed doctrine that protected legitimate federal and state interests. 67
"Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized
restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In codifying the judicially
developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the
established corollary that a trustee could not exercise his abandonment
power in violation of certain state and federal laws. 268 The Court then
goes on to state that "[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if
Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a
judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. 2 69 If Congress
had wanted to grant the trustee an exemption from non-bankruptcy law,
"'the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or
inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in administering
the estate of the bankrupt.' ' 270 The Court held that "Congress did not
intend for § 554(a) to pre-empt all state and local laws., 271 The Court
concluded that Congress did not intend for the abandonment power to
supersede state and local laws and relied272
on a policy "goal of protecting
the environment against toxic pollution."
2.

273

Kelly v. Robinson

This case deals with criminal restitution and a discharge of debt
under § 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.274 In Kelly, the Court
263. See id.
264. See id. at 499.
265. Id.
266.
267.

See id. at 500.
See id.

268. Id. at 501.
269. Id.
270.

Id. (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441,444 (1904)).

271. Id. at 506.
272. Id. at 505 (quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S.
116, 143 (1985).
273. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
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examined the question of "whether restitution obligations, imposed as
conditions of probation in state criminal proceedings, are dischargeable
in proceedings under Chapter 7. " 275 Carolyn Robinson pled guilty to
second degree larceny based upon a wrongful receipt of $9,932.95 in
welfare benefits from the state of Connecticut.276 She was then put on
probation for five years, but had to make restitution in the amount of
$100 a month for the length of her probation to the State of Connecticut
Office of Adult Probation. 277 In February of 1981, she filed a petition
under Chapter 7 listing her restitution obligation as a debt.278 The agency
did not participate in the distribution of her estate and the bankruptcy
court granted her a discharge.279 In 1984, the Connecticut Probation
Office informed Robinson that she still owed them restitution because
the obligation was nondischargeable. 280 Robinson then filed an adversary
proceeding in bankruptcy court, seeking a declaration that the debt was
discharged and an injunction against the State from making her pay. 28I
The bankruptcy court held that "even if the probation condition was
a debt subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction, it was nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(7) of the Code., 282 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, and held that the particular condition of Robinson's probation
was not protected from discharge.283 The Supreme Court did not apply
the plain meaning rule because the text was only the starting point for
determining a statute. 284 "'In expounding a statute, we must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' 285 The Court
274. See id. at 41. The pertinent part of section 523(a)(7) reads:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt- . .. (7) to the extent such debt is for a
fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is
not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty--(A) relating to a
tax of a kind not specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection; or (B) imposed with
respect to a transaction or event that occurred before three years before the date of the
filing of the petition.
S1I
U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2000).
275. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 38.
276. See id.
277. See id.at 38-39.
278. See id.at 39.
279. See id.
280. See id.at 39-40.
281. See id.at 40.
282. Id. at 41.
283. See id.at 43.
284. See id.
285. Id. (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221 (1986)) (other

citations omitted).
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does "'not read these statutory words with the ease of a computer. There
is an overriding consideration that286equitable principles govern the
exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction."
"Despite the clear statutory language, most courts refused to allow a
discharge in bankruptcy to affect the judgment of a state criminal
court. 287 The reasoning behind this is that a bankruptcy proceeding is
civil in nature and is intended to relieve the honest debtor of his debt and
give him a chance to have a fresh start.288 The Court held that restitution
orders operate for the benefit of the state and not for the victim and those
interests put restitution orders within the meaning of § 523(a)(7).289
In construing the statute the language itself is only a starting
point.290 The statutory language clearly provides that courts should allow
a discharge in bankruptcy to effect the judgment of a state criminal court
but most courts do not interpret the Act this way. 29' "If Congress had
intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any other provision, to discharge state
criminal sentences, "'we can be certain that there would have been
hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so
inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so likely to
arouse public outrage.' 292 The Court held that "[i]n light of the strong
interests of the States, the uniform construction of the old Act over threequarters of a century, and the absence of any significant evidence that
Congress intended to change the law in this area, we believe this result
best effectuates the will of Congress. 29 3 The Supreme Court reversed
the Second Circuit ruling and held that discharges are not allowed in
criminal cases.2 94
C. Pre-PetitionRetainers
One alternative theory that may allow attorneys to collect their fees
from the debtor's estate is to receive a pre-petition retainer from their
client before filing for bankruptcy. Pursuant to § 328(a) a pre-petition
retainer must be reasonable, disclose all the facts and the only way it
would be denied is if it is found to be excessive. 295 If the attorneys were
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 49 (quoting Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966)).
Id. at 45.
See id. at 46.
See id. at 53.
See id.
at 43.
See id. at 45.
Id. at 51 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 209 (1978) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
Id. at 53.
See id.
See Joseph Gleason Minias, Note, Text and Context: Discerning the Basis for Debtor's
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paid before the filing for bankruptcy then they would be allowed to keep
their fees. The problem is with getting paid for the attorneys' services in
Chapter 7 proceedings. Here, the money would still be in the retainer and
many courts, including Equipment Services, hold that a pre-petition
retainer is property of the estate.2 96 Section 542(a) states that a party
holding property of the estate must give it to the trustee.2 97 Property of
the estate includes all interests in the debtors' property at the
commencement of the case and any interest received after the
commencement of the case.298 Therefore, an attorney who has been
denied compensation by a court that relies on the plain meaning of the
statue will likely be denied compensation through a pre-petition
retainer. 299 This occurs because the retainer would be considered
property of the estate and pursuant to § 330 attorneys will not be able to
collect their fees from the retainer. However, the Supreme Court has
stated that § 330(a)(1) does not prevent an attorney from receiving
reasonable compensation in advance of a conversion to a Chapter 7 case
but also held that being authorized by the trustee under § 327 is the only
way to receive compensation from the estate. 300 It seems that a prepetition payment for filing would be allowed but that still would not

Attorneys' Fees Under Chapter[sic] 7 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 201, 220
(2001). Section 328(a) reads:
(a) The trustee, or a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, with the court's
approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional person under
section 327 or 1103 of this title, as the case may be, on any reasonable terms and
conditions of employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, or on a contingent
fee basis. Notwithstanding such terms and conditions, the court may allow compensation
different from the compensation provided under such terms and conditions after the
conclusion of such employment, if such terms and conditions prove to have been
improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the
fixing of such terms and conditions.
11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2000); see also 11 U.S.C. § 329 (2000).
296. See In re Equip. Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 739, 747 (4th Cir. 2002); see, e.g., In re Tri-County
Water Ass'n, 91 B.R. 547, 551 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1998); In re Bread & Chocolate, Inc., 148 B.R. 81,
83 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (holding pre-petition retainers are property of the debtor's estate).
297. Section 542(a) reads:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other than a
custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trustee
may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the debtor may exempt under
section 522 of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the
value of such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the
estate.
11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2000).
298. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2002).
299. See Minias, supra note 295, at 221-22.
300. See id. at 1031-32.
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allow payment for services rendered after the filing through a prepetition retainer without going through § 327.
Another possible way to secure compensation is a lien. 30 1 However
in Johnson, the court decided that a lien "'simply secures the amount of
the underlying debt as determined by the bankruptcy court.'... [T]hat
lien can only attach to the fees allowed by the Court and, under ProSnax, that fee is limited to pre-appointment services only. 30 2 Thus,
when a court determines that a retainer or a lien is property of the estate
30 3
the attorney most likely has lost his chance of receiving compensation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Lamie v. United States
Trustee 30 4 does not put an end to the issue of whether or not Chapter 7
debtors' attorneys can collect their fees from the bankruptcy estate. The
Supreme Court has held that the plain meaning of § 330(a)(1) governs
and that the only way that attorneys in this situation can collect their fees
from the estate is through § 327 with the approval of the trustee and the
court. However, this leaves attorneys out in the cold if they are not able
to receive authorization from the trustee after a case has been converted
into a Chapter 7 proceeding. These attorneys may have provided
valuable services to the debtor but then have to wait for conformation by
the trustee and the court in order to receive compensation for their
services. This could possibly leave attorneys out to dry if the trustee
feels another party could better use the money left in the estate.
The Supreme Court decided to use the plain meaning approach in
order to decide this issue.30 5 This was not the only option for the Court to
use. The Supreme Court could have held that the statute is ambiguous
and by examining the legislative history it could have reached the
conclusion that debtors' attorneys should be allowed to collect their fees
from the debtors' estate. A third option is that the Court could have held
that while the statute is plain on its face, public policy would dictate that
debtors' attorneys should still be allowed to collect their fees from the
debtors' estate, as was done in Midlantic and Kelly involving different
issues in bankruptcy cases.30 6 This is an option that can be used in future
301.

Seeid.at222.

302. In re Johnson, 234 B.R. 671, 675-76 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1995) (quoting In re Monument
Auto Detail, Inc., 226 B.R. 219, 225 (B.A.P.9th Cir. 1998)).

303.

See Minias, supra note 295, at 222-23.

304.
305.

124 S.Ct. 1023 (2004).
See id. at 1025.

306. Midlantic and Kelly as described earlier are two examples of the Supreme Court in a
bankruptcy case going against the plain meaning of the statute. The Court could also rely on Church
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cases that come before the Court or lower courts when there is an
overwhelming policy issue and a statute that appears plain on its face.
When this type of situation arises the Court can use the path of
Midlantic and Kelly to find that even though the plain language dictates a
particular result the other result may be better. In Midlantic, the Court
held that "if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation
of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific., 30 7 This is
similar to the present issue because Congress has never made its
intention known that it specifically meant to exclude debtors' attorneys
from the list of people who would be able to collect their fees from the
debtors' estate. While in Kelly, the Supreme Court stated that "'In
expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and
to its object and policy.' 30 8 The Court does "'not read these statutory
words with the ease of a computer. There is an overriding consideration
that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy
jurisdiction. ,,309
Applying the language that is used in Kelly to the present situation,
the Court had a way to read into the statute past the plain meaning. An
overriding equitable principle that can govern bankruptcy is the
awarding of fees to the debtor's attorney. There are measures in place
that make sure that an attorney is not providing duplicative services to
the estate and a sound policy would be to compensate those attorneys
who do represent the bankruptcy estate. If you do not compensate these
attorneys then it is very likely that they will move to another field and
you will not get new attorneys into the field of bankruptcy. It is
important to attract not only good attorneys who would want to work in
bankruptcy but also new attorneys who will be able to excel in this area
of the law. Not allowing attorneys to collect their fees or leaving the law
in its current state of limbo will push attorneys into other areas of
practice and keep new attorneys out of this particular area. The statute
read alone is plain on its face but finding the statute to not allow
bankruptcy lawyers to collect their fees from the debtor's estate will hurt
the profession. Sound equitable policy would dictate that lawyers in the
field should receive their fees from the debtor's estate in order to assure
payment. Attorneys should be able to collect their fees because they
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892), and United Steelworkers ofAmerica,
AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) as discussed supra Part IV.
307. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986).
308. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,
477 U.S. 207, 221 (1986)) (other citations omitted).
309. Id. at 49. (quoting Bank of Martin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966)).
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provide assistance to the debtor and the debtor's many duties. 310 Debtors
need and desire the assistance of attorneys in such functions as attending
a creditors meeting and answering questions posed by the creditors
regarding the assets and liabilities of the estate, filing a list of creditors,
surrendering the relevant books and records, appearing at discharge
hearings and cooperating in examining proofs of claim. 31 Conditioning

the rewarding of attorney's fees upon trustee approval is not only unfair
to the attorney but also to the debtor who may desire an attorney's
assistance on one of the above matters. The debtor may not be able to
pay for the attorney out of his own pocket, so then the debtor would have
to await trustee approval in order to receive advice of counsel, an
approval that is not even guaranteed.
Using the reasoning found in Kelly and Midlantic is beneficial to
the court system because it will allow an equitable result when one may
not be read into the statute. However, I do not assert that this type of
logic should be used in every case as it would thus render the
Bankruptcy Code meaningless and base claims upon what is equitable.
The Code is set up to strike a balance between gathering the estate's
assets for the dual purpose of maximizing the creditor's recovery as well
as rehabilitating the debtor.31 2 Thus, this type of logic should only be
used in cases that would have a wide effect across the bankruptcy
community.
The Supreme Court may have the final word as to this issue as it
pertains to the court system, but it does not have the final overall word.
This word belongs to Congress. Congress should amend 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a) to include the words "or debtor's attorney" as it did before the
1994 amendments. Congress could also enact a Technical Corrections
Act. Congress has previously used the Technical Corrections Act to
correct federal statutes in the Tax Code. 313 This process was started in
1997 but Congress refused to vote on the bills that were known as the
"Bankruptcy Law Technical Corrections Act of 1997.'
In light of the public policy issues concerning the collection of fees
the best way to solve this problem is to allow attorneys to collect their
fees from the debtor's estate. That was the way the system worked
before the changes in the Bankruptcy Code in 1994, which did not give
310. Reply Br. for Pet'r at 18, Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (2004) (No. 02-693).
311. See id.
312. See Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC (In re Qualitech), 327 F.3d 537, 548
(7th Cir. 2003).
313. See IRS Restructing and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, Title VI, 112 Stat. 790
(1998).
314. See Minias, supra note 295, at 227; see also In re Eggleston Works Loudspeaker Co., 253
B.R. 519, 524 (B.A.P.6th Cir. 2000); Cong. Rec. H.R. 120, 105th Cong. (1997).
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any indication that the change was intended or would be for the benefit
of either attorneys or parties in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Having Congress amend the Bankruptcy Code would be in the best
interests of bankruptcy attorneys. Congress should allow attorneys to
collect their fees from the debtors' estate. Allowing the attorneys to
collect their fees is a good policy to undertake. Section 330 contains
other language that would make sure that the attorneys' fees collected
were for services that are actual and necessary to benefit the estate.31 5
There are also strong public policy concerns towards compensating
attorneys in bankruptcy cases the same way that attorneys in other cases
would be compensated. If the attorneys are not able to receive consistent
and adequate compensation, the quality of attorneys participating in
bankruptcy will decrease. This would not be good for bankruptcy
litigation because good lawyers would no longer practice in this field
which would be followed by a decrease in the quality of services offered
to clients.
FrankMisiti*

315. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(l)(A), (3)(C) & (4).
* I would like to thank Professor Alan N. Resnick for his help in writing this Note and the
Honorable F. Dana Winslow for all his support and guidance throughout my law school career. I
also want to thank my parents, family and friends for all the love and support they have given me.
My deepest gratitude goes to the editors and staff of the Hofstra Law Review, particularly Jordan L.
Santeramo, Michael I. Schnipper, Daniel J. Venditti, Christopher Barbaruolo and Daniel H. Smith
for all their help in writing and publishing this Note. This Note is dedicated to my fiancee, Rosa
Romeo, for her unwavering love, support and encouragement throughout not only law school but all
my endeavors.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 5

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss2/5

36

